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ABSTRACT—Over the past several decades, the Supreme Court and most
First Amendment scholars have taken the position that the primary reason
why the First Amendment protects freedom of speech is to advance
democratic self-governance. In this Article, I will argue that this position,
while surely correct insofar as it goes, is also radically incomplete. The
fundamental problem is that the Court and, until recently, scholars have
focused exclusively on the Religion Clauses and the Free Speech Clause.
The rest of the First Amendment—the Press, Assembly, and Petition
Clauses—might as well not exist. The topic of this Article is the five
rights—speech, press, assembly, association, and petition—that I call the
Democratic First Amendment.
I will argue that the Democratic First Amendment is best read to adopt
a particular vision of citizenship, one associated with the Democratic
Republican philosophy of Thomas Jefferson and his allies. Citizens, on this
view, are meant to be active in a myriad of ways, to engage with and even
challenge their elected representatives, and to develop and communicate
their values and opinions jointly, through assemblies and associations. It
stands in sharp contrast to the passive form of citizenship, limited to
biennial voting, favored by Jefferson’s Federalist adversaries. Each of the
rights of the Democratic First Amendment, I show, advance this kind of
democracy. More importantly, these rights are, to use the Supreme Court’s
term, “cognate,” and must be exercised in combination to enable
meaningful and active citizenship. The First Amendment, in short, is not
just democratic, it is also kaleidoscopic.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades, the Supreme Court has repeatedly taken
the position that the primary—albeit not necessarily the only—reason why
the First Amendment protects freedom of speech is to advance democratic
self-governance.1 Moreover, there is also broad consensus among First
Amendment scholars supporting this view.2 In this Article, I will argue that
this position, while surely correct insofar as it goes, is also radically
incomplete.
The Court’s ruminations about the purpose of the Free Speech Clause
fail to answer three overlapping questions. First, what is the relevance of
the fact the Free Speech Clause does not stand alone, but rather is
accompanied by other equally important provisions? Second, how exactly
does the Free Speech Clause, in combination with those other provisions,
advance self-governance? And third, what role does the First Amendment
as a whole envision for citizens in a representative democracy? These are
important questions, requiring careful consideration that they have not yet
received.
The problem starts with the Supreme Court. One noteworthy feature
of the Supreme Court’s modern First Amendment jurisprudence is that it is
not truly a First Amendment jurisprudence at all; rather, it is a series of
decisions interpreting the Religion Clauses and the Free Speech Clause.
The rest of the First Amendment—the Press, Assembly, and Petition
1

See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Details: Specific Facts and the First Amendment, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 1,
33–35 (2012) (summarizing cases expounding democratic reading of the Free Speech Clause); Walker
v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 (2015) (“[T]he Free Speech
Clause helps produce informed opinions among members of the public, who are then able to influence
the choices of a government . . . .”).
2
Bhagwat, supra note 1, at 32–33 (summarizing scholarship).
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Clauses—might as well not exist. The Press Clause has been entirely
subsumed by the Free Speech Clause.3 The Assembly Clause has not been
addressed in over thirty years.4 The relevance of the Petition Clause has
been limited to the peripheral issue of access to courts5—and even in that
sphere, a recent decision limits its independent significance.6 Even the
nontextual right of association, which has not been entirely abandoned, has
been made subservient to free speech, even though historically the right
clearly derived from the Assembly Clause.7
For a long time, First Amendment scholarship was similarly blinkered.
Recent years, however, have seen an explosion of scholarship examining
the history and meaning of the rest of the First Amendment, especially the
Assembly and Petition Clauses.8 This scholarship is extremely valuable, but
it too suffers from a flaw: it fails to take seriously the proposition that
democratic rights protected by the First Amendment are not independent
points, but rather are deeply interrelated and overlapping.9 And it is
impossible to fully understand how these rights function, as well as the
vision of democratic citizenship they advance, without taking into account
that interrelationship.
The topic of this Article, then, is those five rights—speech, press,
association, assembly, and petition—what I call the Democratic First
Amendment. Each of these rights has independent significance, but they
also operate in combination with one another. I will also argue that the
Democratic First Amendment is best read to adopt a particular vision of
citizenship, one associated with the democratic-republican philosophy of
Thomas Jefferson and his allies. Citizens, on this view, are meant to be
active in a myriad of ways, to engage with and even challenge their elected
representatives, and to develop and communicate their values and opinions

3

Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a Realistic
Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 258 n.29 (2004) (citing
David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 430, 448–50 (2002)); 2 RODNEY A.
SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 22:6, Westlaw (database updated 2014).
4
JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY 62 (2012).
5
Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 387 (2011).
6
Id. at 389–90 (treating Petition and Speech Clauses as equivalent in the context of government
employment).
7
See generally INAZU, supra note 4, ch. 4.
8
See, e.g., id.; RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE: SEDITIOUS
LIBEL, “OFFENSIVE” PROTEST, AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR A REDRESS OF
GRIEVANCES (2012); Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Changing the People: Legal Regulation and American
Democracy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2011); Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly,
56 UCLA L. REV. 543 (2009).
9
See Timothy Zick, Recovering the Assembly Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 375, 383–84 (2012)
(making a similar criticism).
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jointly, through assemblies and associations. It stands in sharp contrast to
the passive form of citizenship, limited to biennial voting, favored by
Jefferson’s Federalist adversaries and by some modern scholars. The First
Amendment, in short, is both democratic and kaleidoscopic.
I.

DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS

In this Part, I will briefly review the origins and purposes of each of
the five rights constituting the Democratic First Amendment. Essential
antecedents to the American Bill of Rights include medieval English
practices, the English Bill of Rights of 1689, and various postrevolutionary state bills of rights, the most important of which is the
Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776. In addition, a full understanding of
the drafting history must take account of George Mason’s Master Bill of
Rights, which provided the template for many of the proposals for
amendments that emerged from the state ratifying conventions,10 and for
James Madison’s original proposed constitutional amendments, presented
to Congress on June 8, 1789.11 Also relevant, of course, are subsequent
revisions in Congress that produced the eventual amendments sent to the
states. Obviously, in this short space, a thorough analysis of each of these
complex histories is impossible, but even a summary yields important
insights.
As a starting point, it should be noted that the five rights constituting
the Democratic First Amendment derive from four clauses in the text of the
First Amendment—Speech, Press, Assembly, and Petition12—along with
one nontextual right, association. This list notably excludes the Religion
Clauses.13 The reason for this is rooted in the distinct historical roots of the
Religion Clauses. I have summarized this history in greater detail
elsewhere,14 but briefly, if one looks at the antecedents to our Bill of
Rights, it becomes clear that religious rights were seen as quite distinct
from speech, press, assembly, and petition. In James Madison’s original
proposals to Congress, the Religion Clauses were listed separately from
10

GEORGE MASON’S MASTER DRAFT OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, CONST. SOC’Y ¶¶ 15, 16, 20,
http://www.constitution.org/gmason/amd_gmas.htm [perma.cc/7N9P-MBC5].
11
Amendments Offered in Congress by James Madison June 8, 1789, CONST. SOC’Y,
http://www.constitution.org/bor/amd_jmad.htm [perma.cc/P9JG-QRAE].
12
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.”).
13
Id. (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof . . . .”).
14
See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Religious Associations: Hosanna-Tabor and the Instrumental Values of
Religious Groups, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 73, 92–93 (2014).
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what became the rest of the First Amendment.15 More tellingly, in George
Mason’s Master Draft of the Bill of Rights and in the Virginia Declaration
of Rights of 1776, religious rights do not appear contiguously to speech,
press, assembly, and petition (indeed, speech, assembly, and petition do not
even appear in the Virginia Declaration).16 Finally, it is noteworthy that in
the drafting process in Congress, the Speech, Press, Assembly, and Petition
Clauses were combined into one proposed amendment quite early.17 The
Religion Clauses did not get combined with the others, however, until
September 9, 1789, just weeks before final adoption, when the Senate did
so without explanation.18
What the above history demonstrates is that the Religion Clauses are
different from the rest of the First Amendment and should be understood to
have distinct roots and serve distinct goals. It does not, however, clearly
establish that a relationship exists between the remaining provisions of the
First Amendment, much less that they serve common, democratic goals. If
one examines the roots of each of the democratic rights individually and in
a bit of detail, however, such commonalities quickly become obvious.
A. Freedom of Speech
Free speech lies at the center of the modern First Amendment. It
seems likely that more ink, both judicial and scholarly, has been spilt
discussing free speech than the rest of the First Amendment (including the
Religion Clauses) put together—which makes it all the more interesting
that the Free Speech Clause has the most shallow and obscure history of
any provision of the First Amendment. The English Bill of Rights of 1689
did not provide any protection for free speech (aside from the speech of
members of Parliament),19 nor, as noted earlier, did the Virginia
Declaration of Rights of 1776.20 Indeed, of the thirteen original states, only
one—Pennsylvania—protected free speech in its state constitution.21 More
generally, the great debates in the eighteenth century over free expression
were entirely focused on the press; speech was at best an afterthought,
15

Amendments Offered in Congress by James Madison, supra note 11.
GEORGE MASON’S MASTER DRAFT OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 10; THE VIRGINIA
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS (1776) §§ 12, 16, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/
virginia_declaration_of_rights.html [perma.cc/665F-8ST7].
17
THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, & ORIGINS 130 (Neil H.
Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015).
18
Id. at 133, 139.
19
ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS (1689), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/england.asp
[perma.cc/U4NH-2KBS].
20
See VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
21
LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 5 (1985).
16
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linked to freedom of the press but not terribly important.22 It is precisely
this lack of history that has permitted such broad debates in recent years
about the underlying functions of free speech.
Despite this lack of history, however, as this Article began by noting,
a broad consensus has emerged over the past half-century regarding the
fundamental reason why the Constitution protects free speech: to advance
democratic self-governance.23 This position has been defended ably by a
vast array of First Amendment scholars including Robert Post,24 Jim
Weinstein,25 Cass Sunstein,26 Robert Bork,27 and Alexander Meiklejohn.28
The Supreme Court has reiterated the same thought repeatedly, both in
majority opinions29 and in separate opinions by individual justices,30
including most famously and originally in Justice Brandeis’s seminal
concurring opinion in Whitney v. California.31
Not only is the consensus about the fundamental purpose of the Free
Speech Clause broad, it is entirely supported by history. As discussed
earlier, during the Framing period, free speech principles were largely seen
as linked to, and derivative of, press freedoms. As we shall soon see,
however, there can be no serious doubt that the institutional function of
freedom of the press has always been understood to be to preserve
democracy and check government tyranny. Aside from its link to the press,
moreover, there is good historical evidence that prior to the American
22

Philip B. Kurland, The Original Understanding of the Freedom of the Press Provision of the
First Amendment, 55 MISS. L.J. 225, 237 (1985).
23
See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
24
Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 482 (2011); Robert
C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic
Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 670 (1990).
25
James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech
Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 493–97 (2011).
26
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 121–24 (1993).
27
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20–21
(1971).
28
Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255
(1961).
29
See, e.g., Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 (2015)
(“[T]he Free Speech Clause helps produce informed opinions among members of the public, who are
then able to influence the choices of a government . . . .”); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 53 (1976) (per curiam); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269
(1964).
30
See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 787 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); Wilkinson v. United
States, 365 U.S. 399, 421–23, 422 n.11 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
31
274 U.S. 357, 372–79 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). For a discussion of the enormous
influence of Brandeis’s Whitney opinion, see Ashutosh A. Bhagwat, The Story of Whitney v. California:
The Power of Ideas, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 383, 403–06 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed.
2009).
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Revolution, the primary meaning of the term “freedom of speech” referred
to the immunity that legislators enjoyed for their speeches on the floor of
the legislature.32 This immunity was explicitly recognized in the English
Bill of Rights.33 It was also protected by most colonial charters,34 and of
course found its way into the U.S. Constitution in the form of the Speech
and Debate Clause.35 It should be perfectly obvious, however, that
immunizing the speech of legislators has no connection to putative First
Amendment justifications such as individual self-fulfillment36 or the search
for truth.37 The sole purpose of protecting legislative speech is advancing
democratic self-governance by protecting the elected legislature—the
representatives of the people—from royal tyranny. Insofar as the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment was seen to derive from these
earlier legislative protections, presumably its function was understood in
similar terms.
B. Freedom of the Press
When we move beyond free speech to the rest of the First
Amendment, the instrumental, democratic functions of the relevant rights
become even more self-evident. Let us begin with speech’s cousin,
freedom of the press. Whether and to what extent the press should be
subject to regulation was a central issue of contention in both England and
the colonies prior to the Revolution. In the seventeenth century the great
debate was over licensing the press, but after licensing was abandoned in
1694 in England (and soon thereafter in the colonies)38 the debate switched
to the propriety of punishing the press, primarily for seditious libel.39 This
history has produced a raging debate over whether the Press Clause of the
First Amendment prohibits only licensing and other prior restraints, or also
limits subsequent punishments.40 Regardless of the outcome of this debate,
32

See David S. Bogen, The Origins of Freedom of Speech and Press, 42 MD. L. REV. 429, 431
(1983); Kurland, supra note 22, at 255.
33
ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 19.
34
Bogen, supra note 32, at 431–34.
35
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
36
See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47–69 (1989); THOMAS I.
EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4–7 (1966); see also Seana
Valentine Shiffrin, Speech, Death, and Double Effect, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1135, 1158–85 (2003).
37
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
38
Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648, 651
(1955).
39
LEVY, supra note 21, 16–172 (detailing debates over permissibility of seditious libel
prosecutions in both England and the United States).
40
Compare LEONARD LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY
AMERICAN HISTORY (1960) (advocating a narrow, prior-restraints-only view), and Patterson v.
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however, what is clear is that the framing generation understood that liberty
of the press mattered.41
Why did it matter? Antecedents of the Press Clause provide a fairly
clear answer. As noted earlier, the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776
protected the press, but not speech or assembly. Section 12 of the
Declaration reads: “That the freedom of the press is one of the great
bulwarks of liberty, and can never be restrained but by despotic
governments.”42 Similarly, § 16 of George Mason’s Master Draft of the Bill
of Rights reads: “That the People have a right to Freedom of speech, and of
writing and publishing their Sentiments; that Freedom of the Press is one of
the great Bulwarks of Liberty, and ought not to be violated.”43 Finally,
James Madison’s original proposal to Congress copied Mason’s Master
Draft almost verbatim.44 All of these formulations make it clear that the
reason to protect the press is because it is a “bulwark”—i.e., a protector
against external danger—of liberty. The external danger to be feared, of
course, was despotic government. The press, in other words, was an
essential tool for the preservation of liberal democracy because it kept the
people informed of misbehavior by government officials, and so permitted
a response—ideally through the democratic process, but if that was denied
then through revolution. That the Press Clause plays this role has been
acknowledged by hordes of commentators45 and is not really controversial.
But this acknowledgement places the Press Clause squarely at the center of
the Democratic First Amendment.
C. Assembly
In addition to protecting expression (in the form of speech and the
press), the First Amendment also guarantees “the right of the people
peaceably to assemble.”46 As it turns out, in modern times the Assembly
Clause has essentially disappeared from judicial discourse—the Supreme
Colorado ex rel. Attorney Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (Holmes, J.) (same), with id. at 465 (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (defending a broader reading of the Press Clause), Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S.
233, 248 (1936) (same), ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (1967,
reprinted 2001) (same), and David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of
Expression in Early American History, 37 STAN. L. REV. 795 (1985) (same).
41
See David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 487 (1983)
(confirming the significance of press freedoms to the framing generation).
42
THE VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 16, § 12.
43
GEORGE MASON’S MASTER DRAFT OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 10, § 16.
44
Amendments Offered in Congress by James Madison June 8, 1789, supra note 15.
45
See, e.g., Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633–34 (1975); Sonja R.
West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1042 (2011); Anderson, supra note 41, at
488–93.
46
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Court has not addressed the Clause in over thirty years,47 and when issues
arise regarding regulation of public gatherings, they are inevitably litigated
under the public forum doctrine, which the Court treats as a branch of free
speech law.48 It is noteworthy, however, that the framing generation did not
consider assembly to be simply a subset of speech, and indeed, in
Madison’s original proposed amendments (as in George Mason’s Master
Draft), assembly did not even appear in the same provision as speech and
press protections. What were the historical meaning and purposes of
assembly?
We can begin by eliminating a red herring. Because the Assembly
Clause appears in close juxtaposition to the Petition Clause, separated by
the word “and,” some commentators have suggested that the Assembly
Clause only protects assemblies that are organized to prepare and present
petitions to the government.49 As John Inazu has convincingly
demonstrated, however, that reading is inconsistent with the drafting
history, which clearly shows that the Framers viewed assembly and petition
as distinct (albeit related) rights since Madison’s original proposal to
Congress contained two separate rights—a right of “peaceably assembling
and consulting for their common good,” and a right to petition for a redress
of grievances—separated by a semicolon.50
The true meaning of assembly is substantially clarified by an
examination of antecedent versions of the Clause. Assembly is not an
ancient right—it appears in neither the English Bill of Rights, nor the
Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776. Indeed, assemblies continued to be
suppressed in England before and after the American Revolution.51 That
makes the appearance of the assembly right in George Mason’s Master
Draft noteworthy. Section 15 of the Draft, in full, reads as follows: “That
the People have a Right peaceably to assemble together to consult for their
common Good, or to instruct their Representatives, and that every Freeman
has a right to petition or apply to the Legislature for redress of
Grievances.”52 The assembly right is thus matched with the explicitly
political right to instruct representatives, as well as the ancient, and also

47

INAZU, supra note 4, at 62.
See, e.g., Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316 (2002); Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement,
505 U.S. 123 (1992).
49
See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639, 713 (2002).
50
INAZU, supra note 4, at 22–23; Amendments Offered in Congress by James Madison June 8,
1789, supra note 15.
51
Robert M. Chesney, Democratic-Republican Societies, Subversion, and the Limits of Legitimate
Political Dissent in the Early Republic, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1525, 1547 (2004).
52
GEORGE MASON’S MASTER DRAFT OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 10, § 15.
48
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political (as we shall see) right to petition for a redress of grievances.53
When Madison introduced his proposed amendments to Congress, he
eliminated Mason’s proposed right to instruct representatives, but
otherwise largely duplicated Mason’s language (with minor changes in
wording).54 The proposed right, then, was that of the people to assemble to
“consult[] for their common good.”55 The juxtaposition with the instruction
and petition rights also makes clear that this consultation is for political
purposes, in the people’s capacity as citizens. There can be no serious
doubt that this new understanding of the importance of popular assemblies
in democratic politics had been shaped by the experience of the American
Revolution. After all, groups such as the Sons of Liberty, and raucous
assemblies such as the Boston Tea Party (to say nothing of the events
leading up to the Boston Massacre), played a central role in galvanizing
and organizing resistance to British rule, and more broadly in the formation
of the revolutionary ethos.56 Moreover, as the principle of popular
sovereignty began to be broadly accepted in the post-revolutionary era, the
importance of permitting sovereign citizens to consult with each other must
have become increasingly clear, if that principle was to play a meaningful
role in the new republic.
Of course, the phrase “to consult for their common [g]ood” was
eventually dropped from the language of the First Amendment. As is so
often the case, however, the reasons for this change are obscure, but do not
seem to have been driven by a desire to change the meaning of the
Assembly Clause. There were several proposals in Congress to drop the
“common good” language from the proposed amendment, but they were
repeatedly defeated.57 As late as September 3, 1789, the Senate explicitly
rejected a motion to drop the “common good” language.58 Then on
September 9, with no explanation, it combined the Democratic First
Amendment with the Religion Clauses, and dropped the language

53

The fact that Mason placed the instruction right between assembly and petition obviously
negates any notion that assembly is limited to petitioning assemblies.
54
Amendments Offered in Congress by James Madison June 8, 1789, supra note 15 (“The people
shall not be restrained from peaceably assembling and consulting for their common good; nor from
applying to the Legislature by petitions, or remonstrances, for redress of their grievances.”). Madison’s
primary change, then, was to rephrase the amendment as a restriction on government authority rather
than a recognition of a right, but the substance is identical.
55
Id.
56
HARLOW GILES UNGER, AMERICAN TEMPEST: HOW THE BOSTON TEA PARTY SPARKED A
REVOLUTION (2011); Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in
American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 878, 884–85 (1978).
57
THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 17, at 220–21, 232–33.
58
Id. at 220.
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“consulting for the common good.”59 The primary purpose of the
September 9 changes appears to have been to shorten and combine the
proposed amendments rather than to change their substantive content. All
indications are that assembly was viewed as a political right, tied to
citizenship in a system based on popular sovereignty, and there is no reason
to believe that the rewording of the Assembly Clause was intended to alter
that basic understanding.
D. Association/Assembly II
Freedom of association is a right of group membership, meaning a
right to form groups with fellow citizens, or to join preexisting groups. The
Supreme Court has also interpreted association to include rights to
anonymous membership,60 and to exclude members that a group objects
to.61 The word “association” of course does not appear in the text of the
First Amendment, but the Court has found “implicit in the right to engage
in activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to
associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social,
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”62 The origins and
development of the modern right of association are highly convoluted
subjects that have been recounted at length elsewhere,63 and can only be
summarized in this space. Modern judicial recognition of a right of group
membership can be traced to the 1927 decision in Whitney v. California, in
which the Court affirmed Anita Whitney’s conviction for criminal
syndicalism, based on her membership in the Communist Labor Party.64
Though Whitney is often described (and taught) as a free speech case, it
was conceded that Whitney herself had never spoken in favor of violence,
the essence of syndicalism.65 Instead, she was prosecuted because of her
membership in an organization that advocated criminal syndicalism—in
other words, for her associational ties.66 Recognizing this, the majority

59

Id. at 221–22.
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462–63 (1958).
61
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000).
62
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
63
See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 983–89 (2011); INAZU, supra
note 4, ch. 3, 4.
64
274 U.S. 357 (1927). Criminal syndicalism was defined as “any doctrine or precept advocating,
teaching or aiding and abetting the commission of crime, sabotage . . . or unlawful acts of force and
violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial
ownership or control, or effecting any political change.” Id. at 359–60.
65
Id. at 367; Bhagwat, supra note 31, at 387.
66
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 366–67.
60
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described the rights at issue as “free speech, assembly, and association,”67
while Justice Brandeis’s separate opinion (which was also the leading
judicial exposition of the self-governance reading of the First Amendment)
spoke of “free speech and assembly.”68 Whitney and other cases from this
era thus clearly recognize that the First Amendment protects a right of
group membership, sometimes called a right of association and sometimes
simply called assembly, and that this right derives squarely from the
Assembly Clause.69
It should also be noted that while judicial recognition of a right of
group membership did not occur until the twentieth century, arguments to
that effect can be traced back to the very origins of the republic, during the
great debates over the Democratic-Republican societies in the mid-1790s.70
These societies, groups of citizens united in support of the French
Revolution, were highly controversial, especially among their Federalist
political opponents. For our purposes, what is important is that supporters
of the societies explicitly invoked the rights of association and assembly to
defend their legitimacy.71 Indeed, even Federalist opponents of the
societies, including John Adams, often described them as assemblies, albeit
subversive and therefore illegal ones.72 Admittedly, not everyone supported
such a reading of the First Amendment—Washington himself argued that
while temporary gatherings of citizens were protected assemblies,
permanent groups that arrogated to themselves the right to criticize elected
officials were impermissible.73 And no doubt other Federalists shared his
views—though, given that these same people shortly thereafter passed the
Alien and Sedition Acts, their fealty to First Amendment principles might
be questioned. Regardless, there has existed in the United States a long,
albeit contested, tradition of recognizing group membership as a core First
Amendment right. I will argue later in this Article that history supports the
view that this tradition, associated with the Republican politics of Jefferson
and Madison, is more closely reflected in the First Amendment than the
countervailing Federalist perspective.74
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Id. at 371.
Id. at 372–79 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
69
See, e.g., Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399–402, 409 (1950); Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530–32 (1945); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364–65 (1937).
70
See generally Chesney, supra note 51; Mazzone, supra note 49, at 730–42.
71
Chesney, supra note 51, at 1565 n.203, 1567–69.
72
Id. at 1563, 1578–79.
73
Id. at 1558–60; Mazzone, supra note 49, at 739–40.
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See infra Part III.
68

1108

110:1097 (2016)

Democratic First Amendment

It must be acknowledged, however, that the modern Supreme Court no
longer recognizes the broad right of association described above. Instead,
since its 1958 decision in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,75 the Court
has steadily narrowed the association right, redefining it as a right of
“expressive association,” restricted to groups that engage in expressive
activities, and one derived from and subsidiary to the right of free speech.76
Nonexpressive associations, under the modern approach, receive no
constitutional protection, and even expressive ones may be regulated with
respect to their membership policies if the regulations do not interfere with
their ability to communicate.77 It is clear, however, that these doctrinal
developments are entirely inconsistent with the text and history of the First
Amendment since they ignore the fact that the association right is
historically rooted in the Assembly Clause, not the Speech Clause. They
should therefore not be permitted to obscure our broader understanding of
the Democratic First Amendment.
Finally, once the history of the right of association/assembly is
understood, its link to democratic self-governance becomes obvious. First
of all, the right of group membership derives from the Assembly Clause,
which, as we have already seen, has always been closely tied to democratic
citizenship and self-governance. Second, as early as the 1790s, defenders of
private associations—in particular, of the Democratic-Republican
societies—argued that such groups were essential in a democracy to
communicate the people’s wishes to public officials, and to act as sentinels
against official misconduct.78 Third, the Supreme Court has itself
repeatedly recognized that democratic politics require free associations of
citizens.79 In short, once it is acknowledged that the First Amendment
protects group membership, it becomes obvious beyond peradventure that
the reason it does so is to enable and advance democratic self-governance.
E. Petition
The last clause of the First Amendment protects “the right of the
people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”80
Despite its modern obscurity, the petition right is in fact the most ancient of
the First Amendment’s guarantees. Petitioning was practiced in pre75

357 U.S. 449 (1958).
These developments are described in detail in INAZU, supra note 4, ch. 3, 4.
77
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626–27 (1984).
78
Chesney, supra note 51, at 1539, 1549–50, 1569.
79
See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234, 250 (1957).
80
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
76
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Norman England, and a partial right of petition (for Barons) was
recognized in the Magna Carta.81 Petitions by the public, directed at both
King and Parliament, became common during the Middle Ages,82 and
crucially, the English Bill of Rights of 1689 codified an absolute right of
“the subjects to petition the king,” further providing that “all commitments
and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal.”83 As such, petitioning
government officials was a well-established right and practice, both in
England and in the colonies, well before the American Revolution.84
Petitioning was also an explicitly political practice well before the
American Revolution. In the early days, petitions addressed largely private
matters, and were really akin to modern judicial suits.85 By the seventeenth
century, however, petitioning had evolved to the point where petitions
regularly sought broader legislation or policy changes,86 and were also
regularly presented by groups or associations formed for the purpose of
petitioning.87 These petitioning practices, though they evolved in England,
migrated fully to the American colonies.88 Indeed, probably because of a
very different political culture, petitioning was more common, and more
significant, in the colonies than in the mother country.89 And after the
adoption of the Constitution, petitions began flowing to the First Congress
immediately, well before the First Amendment was proposed or ratified.90
There can also be no doubt about the essentially political nature of
most petitioning. Petitioning, of course, can exist in the absence of
democracy—as in medieval England—and even then can serve a political
function. In the political culture of the early American Republic, however,
petitioning served as a key tool by which citizens could communicate their
wishes and desires to their elected representatives. Indeed, in an era when a
large percentage of citizens were disenfranchised, petitioning was often one
of the only forms of political participation available to those citizens.91 And
even for voting citizens, petitioning provided a means to convey their
wishes to representatives between elections. This is no doubt why George
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85
86
87
88
89
90
91

1110

KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 8, at 84–85.
Id. at 85–86.
ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 19.
KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 8, at 86–88.
Id. at 85–86.
Id. at 86–87.
Mazzone, supra note 49, at 722–23.
Id. at 724–25.
KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 8, at 104–07.
Id. at 10–11, 110–11.
See Mazzone, supra note 49, at 729–30 (making a similar point).

110:1097 (2016)

Democratic First Amendment

Mason in his Master Draft placed the right to petition immediately after the
people’s right to instruct their representatives (a right that Madison
rejected)92—both were avenues for citizens to influence and control their
legislators, aside from the crude tool of representative elections.
In sum, what we find through a close examination of the First
Amendment as a whole is that each of the five rights protected by the nonreligious parts of the Amendment—freedom of speech, freedom of the
press, assembly, association, and petition—are important, independent
rights with distinct histories. What they have in common, however, is that
each of the rights has as its primary goal the advancement of democratic
self-governance. Each, moreover, provides a distinct path for citizens to
participate in and influence their government. Now we turn to the question
of how these rights interact, and how they operate in tandem.
II. COGNATE RIGHTS
In De Jonge v. Oregon, the Supreme Court reversed Dirk De Jonge’s
conviction for criminal syndicalism, holding that the Assembly Clause of
the First Amendment did not permit the State to criminalize simple
attendance at a meeting held under the auspices of the Communist Party.93
The Court used these words to describe the assembly right and its
significance:
The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and
free press and is equally fundamental. . . . ‘The very idea of a government,
republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably
for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of
grievances.’94

Eight years later, in Thomas v. Collins,95 the Court reiterated this point
in even stronger language. It spoke of “the preferred place given in our
scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the
First Amendment.”96 The Court then said the following:
It is therefore in our tradition to allow the widest room for discussion, the
narrowest range for its restriction, particularly when this right is exercised in
conjunction with peaceable assembly. It was not by accident or coincidence
that the rights to freedom in speech and press were coupled in a single
guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition

92
93
94
95
96

GEORGE MASON’S MASTER DRAFT OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 10, § 15.
299 U.S. 353, 365–66 (1937).
Id. at 364 (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875)).
323 U.S. 516 (1945).
Id. at 530.
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for redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, are inseparable. They
are cognate rights . . . and therefore are united in the First Amendment’s
assurance.97

What did the Court mean when it described assembly and petition as
“cognate rights” to freedom of speech and the press? And why did it
describe these four rights as “democratic freedoms?” The answers to these
questions go the heart of my argument in this Article.
At first glance, the above questions seem trivial. These rights are
“cognate” because they are similar in nature and share common roots (that
is the definition of cognate98), and they are “democratic freedoms” because
their common nature is that they all advance democratic self-governance. It
turns out, however, that this simple answer hides a multitude of sins. In
particular, it does not seriously address what exactly we mean by
democratic self-governance, or how First Amendment freedoms advance
that process. Once one delves into those questions, serious difficulties
emerge.
The problems began at the very beginning. The philosopher Alexander
Meiklejohn was in his time (the mid-twentieth century) the leading
academic exponent of the democratic reading of the First Amendment (or
rather of the Free Speech Clause, which was Meiklejohn’s focus).
Mieklejohn chose as his model for democratic self-governance a New
England town meeting.99 Meiklejohn thus envisioned self-governance, and
the activities protected by the First Amendment, as part of an organized,
moderated event with strict, and strictly enforced, rules of procedure.100
Speakers must have the floor to speak, must stay on topic, and must speak
civilly.101 And at such meetings, the only things that happen are speeches,
followed by votes. The purpose of the speeches presented at the meeting is
to educate citizens and share views; consequently, Meiklejohn describes
voter education as the sole purpose of speech and press freedoms.102
Finally, one important implication of Meiklejohn’s democratic vision is

97

Id. (citing De Jonge, 299 U.S. at 364).
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ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
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101
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Id. at 26 (explaining that the purpose of free speech is to ensure that voters are “made as wise as
possible”).
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that the significance of citizens, even as speakers, is truncated. As
Meiklejohn put it: “What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but
that everything worth saying shall be said.”103
A moment’s thought should make clear what a radically incomplete
vision of self-governance this is. Critically, it abstracts away from the
representative nature of most American democracy (town meetings and
popular referendums being the rare and narrow exceptions to that rule). It
also ignores the vast complexities introduced by population size and
diversity. Town meetings only work in small jurisdictions, usually with
fairly homogenous populations. Representative democracy in the United
States varies radically from this model, in almost every respect. In
particular, the relative anonymity of citizens in large jurisdictions, the need
for avenues by which citizens may effectively communicate with their
representatives and be heard, and the possibility that citizens might help
shape ideas, public opinion, and the broader culture rather than being
passive targets of education, are all absent from the town meeting model.
A related point is that the Meiklejohn model reduces the Democratic
First Amendment to the Speech Clause and perhaps the Press Clause. There
is no need and no room in the town meeting model for assembly, for
associations of citizens, and for petitions directed at representatives.
Instead, citizens act directly by voting on legislation after interacting
directly with each other. This is not the way real citizens experience real
democracy in the United States, and it is not the vision of democracy
encapsulated in the First Amendment.
The shortcomings of Meiklejohn’s vision are shared, though to a
lesser degree, by two leading modern expositions of the relation between
democracy and the First Amendment: Robert Post’s concept of public
discourse and Cass Sunstein’s concept of public deliberation. Beginning
with Post, in his book Constitutional Domains,104 Dean Post argues that the
concept of “public discourse” has played a central role in the development
of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment doctrine.105 While Post never
provides a single definition of public discourse, he appears to equate the
concept with speech relevant to democratic self-governance, albeit with
some ultimately arbitrary limitations.106 He also emphasizes that because of
the importance of public discourse and the diversity of the American
103
104

Id.
ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT
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Id. at 119.
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public, the First Amendment has been interpreted to protect even highly
intemperate and uncivil speech, so long as it falls within the broad
definition of public discourse.107 Indeed, Post argues that the American
concept of public discourse is entirely dependent on that diversity, because
it is the very act of communicating across different communities and
different cultural values that makes discourse public.108
Cass Sunstein’s vision of the First Amendment shares many
similarities with Robert Post’s vision, albeit with different emphases.
Indeed, Post acknowledges this parallel by citing Sunstein in the very first
footnote of his chapter on public discourse.109 Rather than focusing on
public discourse, Sunstein argues that the constitutional significance of free
speech is that it creates “a system of democratic deliberation.”110 From this
premise, Sunstein concludes that we have a “‘two tier’ First Amendment,”
which grants greater protection for political speech than other forms of
speech.111 He in turn defines speech as political “when it is both intended
and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue.”112
Sunstein then goes on to discuss in detail why some forms of speech, such
as art and literature, are generally political,113 while other forms, such as
pornography, are not.114
From these brief descriptions, the parallels between Post’s and
Sunstein’s visions of free speech are clear. Both would favor speech related
to democracy over other speech. Both emphasize public debate as the key
value advanced by the First Amendment. And both emphasize the benefits
of diversity and heterogeneity, seeing these aspects of American
democracy as strengthening rather than weakening public discourse and
deliberation, respectively.115 There are also some important differences
between the two. In particular, Sunstein’s more narrow focus on
deliberation, rather than discourse, suggests that he would be less tolerant
of uncivil speech than Post116—though to be sure, Sunstein concedes that
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“racist and sexist speech usually falls within the free speech ‘core.’”117 For
our purposes, however, the key is the commonality.
Post’s and Sunstein’s First Amendment theories are insightful and, to
a substantial extent, convincing. They are also, however, incomplete, in
some of the same ways as Meiklejohn’s approach. To be fair, both Post and
Sunstein are more convincing and more nuanced than Meiklejohn because
both of them, unlike Meiklejohn, take into account the importance of
cultural diversity to American democracy. Post also makes the important
point that Meiklejohn’s highly managed description of democracy, based
on the town meeting, is inconsistent with the premise that citizens may
contest not just substantive issues of policy, but also how a democracy
should procedurally operate.118 Indeed, he dedicates an entire chapter of
Constitutional Domains to this point, calling it “Meiklejohn’s Mistake.”119
Nevertheless, Post and Sunstein share with Meiklejohn one important
thing: a myopic focus on speech, ignoring the rest of the Democratic First
Amendment. Sunstein concedes his focus in the very title of his book. And
although Post speaks regularly about “the First Amendment,” his focus too
is entirely on speech. There are, however, entire aspects of citizenship that
this ignores, including collective action, emotional appeals, and demands
upon political leaders. But these types of activities are no less protected by
the First Amendment than polite discourse on public issues.
It is here, of course, that we enter the realm of the broader Democratic
First Amendment: the rights of assembly, association, and petition. At one
point in his discussion of public discourse, Post posits that a critical
function of such discourse is “collective self-definition,” meaning the
creation of a shared public identity that in turn “enables a culturally
heterogeneous society to forge a common democratic will.”120 He also
argues that this process is an essential aspect of citizenship protected by the
First Amendment. I completely agree with the latter point, but do not see
this as a theory of speech. Instead, I would argue that for individual
citizens, forming and joining in groups with other citizens is even more
important to self-definition than public discourse—indeed, it is necessarily
groups that make this process “collective.” Post’s and Sunstein’s visions of
democracy, and of public debate, are notably individualistic. Citizens are
viewed as speaking as individuals to other individuals, and through this
public process of discourse or deliberation, reaching joint conclusions. Post
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in particular confirms this point early in his book by describing “individual
autonomy” as an essential prerequisite of democracy.121 But again, this is
not how real citizens experience either democracy or public debate.
Certainly, voting is a solitary experience. But when citizens want to act in a
political capacity, they almost always do so through groups, whether it be
formal entities such as political parties, the NRA, and the Sierra Club, or
more informal gatherings such as Occupy. They discover and develop their
values and identities through such groups, and it is only through such
groups that individual citizens can hope to be heard, either by other citizens
or by public officials. In other words, association is essential to citizenship.
Unsurprisingly, assembly plays a similar role, given the common roots
of the association and assembly rights.122 When citizens assemble—
meaning gather together physically (or perhaps virtually as well)123—
entirely new avenues of political participation and citizenship are opened.
For one thing, as noted earlier, the original phrasing of the assembly right
was the right of the people “peaceably to assemble together to consult for
their common Good.”124 This sounds like precisely the sort of “collective
self-definition” that Post attributes to public discourse; but the Assembly
Clause envisions this as a collective activity requiring physical presence as
well as, of course, words. Assemblies, like associations, permit citizens to
magnify their voices manyfold, and so vastly increase the possibility that
they will be heard. Finally, assemblies of citizens do more than develop or
convey specific views about public issues. They also send a signal of
strength and solidarity, which can be as or more important than the
“message.” Indeed, some assemblies—such as Occupy—can be notably
incoherent in their “message,” but that does not necessarily reduce their
political and social significance. Sometimes, in the case of assembly, what
matters is numbers and cohesion, not discourse or deliberation.
Petitioning seems different from association and assembly, and more
like speech, because it is not inherently collective, and because it
necessarily consists of words, albeit in the modern era written words.125 But
petitioning is also meaningfully distinct from most speech. For one thing,
121
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petitions are not broad discussions of public issues, they are specific calls
for action, directed at a specific class of individuals: public officials. Cass
Sunstein describes the goal of our “system of free expression” as “to ensure
broad communication about matters of public concern among the citizenry
at large and between citizens and representatives.”126 That is certainly true,
but misses the point that petitioning is a specific form of communication
between citizen and representative that is quite distinct from either
discourse or deliberation. It is, rather, an antecedent for action (or at least
hoped to be so). One strong indication of the distinctive nature of petitions
was that historically, petition, unlike speech, was considered to require a
(legislative) response.127 Secondly, it is not quite true that petitioning is not
a collective activity. While historically petitioning developed as a means
for individuals to bring private grievances to leaders,128 petitioning had
evolved well before the American Revolution into a means for groups of
citizens to request action on broader public policy issues.129 Moreover, in
England and in the colonies, group petitioning was closely linked to
preexisting associations, and such petitions were important avenues for
political participation for citizens, including otherwise disenfranchised
ones.130 In short, petitioning, like association and assembly, has historically
played a central role in our democracy, and so cannot be ignored if the
actual relationship between democracy and the First Amendment is to be
understood properly.
Democratic theories which focus on speech alone rather than the
broader Democratic First Amendment are not only too narrow, but they
also lead to a misunderstanding about the fundamental nature of American
democracy. Meiklejohn, Post, and Sunstein focus not just exclusively on
speech, but on one particular type of speech: public debate over political,
social, or policy issues. This debate, moreover, is envisioned in a particular
way. Meiklejohn describes a civilized debate following rules of order.131
Post emphasizes that public discourse, to be effective, must constitute
“rational deliberation” (though he concedes that this requirement is in deep
tension with his tolerance for incivility).132 And Sunstein’s description of
democratic deliberation is quintessentially rational.133 This is not
126
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surprising—after all, speech is widely associated in our culture with
rationality. But real democracy does not work this way, nor does the
broader Democratic First Amendment. Rational discourse is certainly (at
least ideally) a part of our system of self-governance, but it is just a part.
Associations can bond citizens on profoundly emotional terms such as love
of nature (the Sierra Club) or guns (the NRA), with no need for rational
explanation. And assemblies often send profoundly emotional messages of
joy or rage, with little attempt at rationality. Antiwar rallies are not like
debate club meetings. And while Martin Luther King, Jr. was a profoundly
thoughtful man, nobody believes that the effectiveness of the civil rights
protests he led stemmed only or primarily from rational arguments as to the
justness of their cause. Indeed, sometimes, as arguably with Occupy and
Donald Trump rallies, the only message sent by an assembly is one of rage,
and demand for largely undefined change. This is not discourse or
deliberation, but it is surely a part of our democracy.
One final point is in order about the workings of the Democratic First
Amendment. Until now, I have emphasized the fact that the rights of
association, assembly, and petition are as important as speech and the press
to an effective democracy, and that all of these rights share common roots
and purposes. They are distinct rights but, as the Supreme Court has said,
“cognate.”134 To say that they are distinct, however, is not to say they are
unrelated. To the contrary, these rights usually operate in combination with
one another, and are much more effective in combination as well. A
complete discussion of how these democratic rights interact is impossible
in this space,135 but some relationships are obvious. Speech is the lifeblood
of associations, because the formation and activities of associations require
speech. Group petitioning is fundamentally linked to assembly, since
before the advent of mass, electronic communication, assemblies were the
only means to create such petitions. Speech is greatly enhanced by
association and assembly, because speech on behalf of large groups of
citizens is far more likely to influence others (including public officials)
than that of individuals acting alone. Indeed, the interrelationship between
these rights is so deep that sometimes they blend together, creating a
kaleidoscopic effect.
These relationships are not just theoretical, they are real and
historically demonstrable. Thus in Ron Krotoszynski’s discussion of the
Selma March of 1965, he concedes that “the event was a synthesis of
speech, assembly, association, and petition,” though his focus is on the
134
135
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last.136 Tabatha Abu El-Haj’s description of street politics similarly reveals
an unrestrained mixture of speech, association, assembly, and sometimes
petitioning, although her particular focus is on assembly.137 And Larry
Kramer has noted the fundamental importance in the colonial period of a
combination of assembly and petitioning, as a means of political
participation.138 It is these forms of collective, complex actions combining
groups, assemblies, speech, and petitions that have given American
democracy its vibrancy.
The kaleidoscopic nature of the Democratic First Amendment has an
important consequence: it means that studies which focus exclusively on
one or two rights of the Democratic First Amendment will necessarily
produce an impoverished vision of the First Amendment, and of its
relationship to democracy. Once the First Amendment is seen as a whole, a
clearer and more accurate picture emerges of how American democracy
functions, and why the First Amendment in its entirety is an essential part
of that process.
There is, however, one piece of the puzzle unresolved: how the
Democratic First Amendment interacts with the representative nature of
American democracy. As noted earlier, one of the key weaknesses of
Meiklejohn’s description of American democracy is that he neglects its
representative nature. There are, as we shall see, similar ambiguities about
how Post’s public discourse, as well as Sunstein’s democratic deliberation,
fit into a representative system. As it turns out, the role of democratic rights
in a representative system of democracy raises some rather complicated
questions, reflecting sharp disputes in the early Republic about the
fundamental nature of citizenship in a representative system. It is to these
questions that we now turn.
III. MODELS OF CITIZENSHIP
Ours is a representative democracy. Aside from a handful of narrow
exceptions—mainly town meetings in New England, and the various
popular initiative processes that emerged during the Progressive era—
essentially all laws in this country are adopted by legislatures made up of
elected representatives.139 Indeed, in Federalist No. 10, Madison invoked
136
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the representative nature of the system it created as a major strength of the
new Constitution.140 This obvious point, however, creates some difficulties
for democratic First Amendment theory. The difficulty, in a nutshell, is that
if laws are to be made by elected representatives, of what use is public
debate on policy issues among citizens who have no direct say over
legislation? And for that matter, what is the relevance of other forms of
citizen activism, including association and assembly, in such a system?141
The answer to both these questions at first glance seems obvious—
even if citizens do not directly make laws, they do vote to choose
representatives, and surely First Amendment liberties are relevant to that
process of choosing. Perhaps, but perhaps not. As it turns out, it all depends
on what we believe to be the nature of representation. When citizens select
legislative representatives, they do not vote solely, or even necessarily
primarily, based on the substantive policy positions adopted by the
candidates. This is true for two reasons: first, because no candidate can
possibly match all of a voter’s policy preferences, compromise is
necessary; second, and more importantly, representatives are not meant to
be simple conduits for the views of their constituents. Rather, they are
supposed to, as Madison puts it, use their “wisdom [to] discern the true
interest of their country.”142 In a similar vein, Cass Sunstein has
convincingly argued that the choice of the First Congress to refuse to
include in the Bill of Rights a right to instruct one’s representatives (and for
that matter, Madison’s choice to drop that provision from George Mason’s
Master Draft) clearly reflected the view that representatives were to
deliberate with their colleagues with an open mind on the issues before
them.143 But this again suggests that citizens should choose representatives
based on their “wisdom,” knowledge, and open-mindedness, not based on
their substantive positions. And if that is the case, what is the point of
substantive discussions among citizens?
For Meiklejohn, the tension described above appears to be
irresolvable. He avoids it simply by assuming (inaccurately) that our
democracy is a direct one, analogous to town meetings.144 Post does not
directly address the issue. It is in Sunstein’s work, however, that this
ambiguity is most apparent. Throughout his book Democracy and the
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Problem of Free Speech, Sunstein insists on the deliberative nature of
American democracy.145 He is, however, studiously ambiguous about who
exactly is supposed to be doing this deliberation. Most of the time, he
appears to envision citizens doing the deliberating, since he ties
deliberation to speech by citizens.146 When he discusses the rejected right of
instruction, however, he clearly views deliberation as occurring among
representatives.147 But of course, it matters a great deal from a First
Amendment perspective which model we believe better reflects American
democracy.
As it turns out, this conflict between two different models of
representation can be traced to the very beginnings of our Republic, as
revealed by two major political crises: the debate over the DemocraticRepublican societies during the Washington Administration, and the
controversy surrounding the Sedition Act during the first Adams
Administration. In each of these instances, disputes between Federalists,
led by John Adams and Alexander Hamilton, and Republicans, led by
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, brought to the fore two distinct
views about the role of citizens in a representative democracy.
The Democratic-Republican societies were private groups of citizens,
supportive of the French Revolution, which operated in the United States
between 1793 and 1795. Their history has been recounted in detail
elsewhere, notably by Robert M. Chesney, and will not be repeated here.148
Unsurprisingly, the societies were generally associated with Jeffersonian
Republicans, who were generally Francophiles, and opposed by the
Federalists, with their more Anglophile orientation. For our purposes, the
key fact is that the Federalist objection to the societies was based on their
view that such groups had no place in a representative system. As both
Chesney and James P. Martin discuss in detail, the Federalist vision of
representative government was that citizens should elect their
representatives based on their abilities, but then leave deliberation over
public issues to those representatives.149 A corollary of this narrow view of
citizenship was that permanent, private groups of citizens dedicated to
political issues, including critiquing representatives, were entirely
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illegitimate. Only representatives could speak for the people, and when
private groups purported to do so, they violated basic democratic
precepts.150 Ultimately, when President Washington endorsed this critique
in a speech, the societies were forced to disband because of Washington’s
unmatched prestige.151 And a few years later, similar thinking led to the
adoption by a Federalist-dominated Congress and President Adams of the
Sedition Act of 1798, which explicitly prohibited both organized
opposition to government measures and seditious speech about the
government.152
What is noteworthy about the Federalist model of citizenship in
representative democracies is how restricted a role it leaves for the liberties
protected by the Democratic First Amendment. Criticism of the work of
representatives is generally suspect, and indeed, citizens and the press were
not generally expected to consider the wisdom of legislation at all.153
Permanent associations of citizens, or at least those directed at political
issues, were also highly suspect because they were usurping the exclusive
role of elected officials as representatives of the people.154 At most, what
citizens could do in this model was occasionally assemble in public to
discuss matters, without any permanent groups or structures,155 and in case
of great need, address petitions to their representatives to communicate
their views.156
This stunted view of citizenship and of the First Amendment is of
course entirely inconsistent with modern sensibilities and with modern
readings of the First Amendment. It is important to note, however, that the
Federalist model did not go unchallenged even during the 1790s. Rather,
Republican supporters of the societies and later opponents of the Sedition
Act, including Madison and Jefferson, articulated a strong vision of
citizenship which was much more active. The Republicans also explicitly
recognized the importance of political associations as a form of
intermediation between citizens and the state, and as vehicles through
which citizens could safely and effectively articulate criticism of
government policies.157 Significantly, these arguments in support of active
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citizenship were often tied directly and explicitly to First Amendment
rights.158 And at the end of the decade, Republicans reprised and expanded
these arguments to develop their arguments against the Sedition Act of
1798, which were ultimately politically (if not legally) successful.159
In short, what becomes relatively clear is that in the very early
American Republic, two very different models of citizenship in a
representative democracy coexisted with each other. One, the Federalist
model, envisioned a largely passive, respectful, and subordinate citizenry.
The other, the Republican model, was much more active, collective,
disrespectful, and even sometimes incendiary. It is doubtful if either side
had fully thought out its competing vision before being forced to do so
during the great crises of the 1790s, but obviously both views had to have
been latent in their thinking before then. The vision of the Democratic First
Amendment that I have outlined above is entirely consistent with the
Republican model, but not with the Federalist one. As a matter of positive
law, the Supreme Court, as well as essentially all scholars, have obviously
adopted the Republican model. I would argue that this is entirely justified,
as a matter of history and common sense. After all, the Federalists were not
the original proponents of the First Amendment, or any Bill of Rights; to
the contrary, they opposed such amendments consistently. The Bill of
Rights was championed by Jefferson,160 and by anti-Federalist opponents of
the Constitution,161 many of whom (such as James Monroe) eventually
became part of the Republican movement. And it was, of course, James
Madison who actually introduced the Bill of Rights into Congress. Given
this uncontroverted background, it seems entirely appropriate to read the
political rights of the Democratic First Amendment from a JeffersonianRepublican angle.
CONCLUSION
The five rights of the Democratic First Amendment—speech, press,
assembly, association, and petitioning—are the linchpins of American
democracy. They protect and nurture the sort of active citizenship and
collective action that have been the lifeblood of our system of government
since its founding. As this Article demonstrates, however, in recent years
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the judiciary has restricted, and largely forgotten the independent
significance of many of these rights, focusing instead myopically on free
speech. These developments are deeply unfortunate for two related reasons.
First, this judicial truncation of the First Amendment is inconsistent with
the deeper structure and purposes of the Amendment. Sensible
interpretation requires attention to structure and purpose, regardless of
one’s interpretational philosophy. As a result, failure to attend to structure
and purpose leads to interpretations and outcomes that lack both internal
cohesion and logical justification.
Second, these developments impose substantial barriers to a revival of
the kind of active citizenship that our democracy desperately needs. The
reason, quite simply, is that the Court’s current fragmented and narrow
approach to the First Amendment regularly leads to the narrowing or even
eradication of important democratic rights. Nonexpressive, but politically
relevant associations are unprotected under current law.162 Reliance on free
speech doctrine exclusively permits the state to impose time, place, and
manner restrictions on public assemblies that are stifling in practice, and
inconsistent with the Assembly Clause in principle.163 And the right to
petition has been stripped of the legal immunity that it was historically
accorded.164 In combination, such judicial abdication results in systematic
underprotection of important political movements such as Occupy and
Black Lives Matter, which are some of the primary vehicles for active
citizenship in contemporary America. There are signs all around us that the
American people may be ready for a revival of active citizenship. But
unless courts are willing to reinvigorate the Democratic First Amendment,
that revival risks being hobbled by unnecessary and unconstitutional
restrictions on the ability of citizens to associate, to assemble in public
places, and to force public officials to attend to their demands.
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